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Self-Inflicted Wounds: How Maoist Missteps Hastened Their Decline

Once considered India’s foremost internal security challenge, the Maoist movement — or Naxalism — is now witnessing an unmistakable downturn. After decades of guerrilla warfare, territorial control, and an aura of defiance, the movement finds itself grappling with shrinking influence, dwindling cadre strength, and a growing irrelevance in the national discourse.

This decline, while influenced by state action, is also the product of the movement’s own strategic and ideological missteps.


From Red Corridor to Narrow Pockets

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In its heyday during the late 2000s, the “Red Corridor” spanned nearly 180 districts across multiple states. As of March 2025, that number has dropped to just 18 districts across six states. Left-wing extremist incidents have fallen by more than half in the past decade, while fatalities have plummeted by nearly 70%.

Even more telling is the drop in Naxal-related incidents — from a peak of 1,936 in 2010 to just 374 in 2024. Such figures are not merely the result of state security measures; they reflect a loss of operational capacity and local support.





Leadership Crisis and Internal Fractures

The death of long-time leader Muppala Lakshmana Rao brought Basava Raju to the helm of the CPI (Maoist). But instead of revival, his tenure accelerated decline.

Unlike his predecessors, Basava Raju lacked the political acumen and ideological magnetism needed to inspire the cadre. His heavy focus on militarism over political outreach alienated civilians, while rigid command structures, internal purges, and failure to listen to local leaders created deep mistrust within the ranks.

Such internal discord was visible at the top — with public criticism of Raju by surviving leaders, intense lobbying for leadership posts, and factionalism undermining unity.


Eroding Ideological Base

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Younger tribals, once fertile ground for recruitment, are now seeking education and jobs rather than violent struggle. The Maoist leadership’s disconnect from ground realities and infighting has led to organizational decay, while growing awareness of government welfare initiatives has exposed the exploitative nature of Maoist control in tribal areas.

Even former stalwarts now question the movement’s core principles. Ginugu Narsimha Reddy, a former Central Committee member, openly stated in 2025: “Armed struggle is not the solution in present times.”


Losing the People

The movement’s own excesses have driven away its support base. Locals — especially Adivasis — have grown weary of violence, particularly the killing of teachers, health workers, and villagers accused of being informers.

Many now believe that while the state’s response is imperfect, the gun is no longer the answer. Tribal youth are increasingly urging former revolutionaries to take responsibility for the destruction caused during their active years.


The Road Ahead

The decline of the Maoist movement is not just a product of security operations; it is equally the outcome of strategic blunders, ideological rigidity, and alienation of the very communities they claimed to represent.

As one former Maoist leader admitted, the era of violent revolution is over. If the movement is to have any future, it will need to abandon the path of armed conflict and embrace peaceful, democratic engagement — a transformation that, so far, its leadership has failed to make.

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