The Terrorist Who Never Attacks: The Invisible Network Behind Terrorism and Kashmir Militancy

On 22 October 2026, authorities arrested two suspected Overground Workers (OGWs) in Jammu and Kashmir's Baramulla district. According to a report by the Press Trust of India (PTI), security forces recovered two improvised explosive devices, a pistol, ammunition and cash from their possession. The arrests followed a joint operation by the Army and Jammu and Kashmir Police. Investigations were still underway.

This incident actually raises a deeper question that deserves attention beyond the immediate investigations and arrests. Does a terrorist need to attack to become an important part of terrorism?

For decades, the public understanding of terrorism has largely revolved around the individual who pulls the trigger, plants a bomb or claims responsibility for an attack. Yet the survival of a terrorist organisation depends on far more than its armed members. Behind every visible act of violence may exist a network of recruiters, financiers, logistical facilitators and intermediaries who sustain the organisation without necessarily participating in an attack.

The changing nature of militancy in Kashmir makes this distinction increasingly important. While counterterrorism operations have targeted armed militants and their commanders, investigations continue to reveal alleged support networks responsible for shelter, communication, recruitment and movement of resources.

The challenge is now no longer confined to identifying the individual who commits violence. It is equally important to understand the organisational structure that makes such violence possible.

A militant may be eliminated in an encounter, but if the network that recruited, financed and supported him survives, has terrorism truly been defeated?

Kashmir's Changing Militant Landscape

For decades, militancy in Kashmir was associated with armed cadres, identifiable commanders, training camps and cross-border infiltration. Organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Hizbul Mujahideen became central to India's counterterrorism concerns. However, sustained security operations and changes in the political and security environment have altered the character of militancy.

The emergence of hybrid militants and organisations such as The Resistance Front and the People's Anti-Fascist Front illustrates this changing landscape. These groups have been identified by Indian authorities as linked to established Pakistan-based terrorist organisations.

The changing pattern raises a critical question. Does the reduction in the number of visible militants necessarily indicate the weakening of the wider terrorist ecosystem?

Not always.

A militant may be eliminated in an encounter, but the individuals responsible for recruitment, financing, shelter and organisational communication may remain active. The disappearance of the attacker does not automatically mean the disappearance of the network.

In June 2025, the National Investigation Agency conducted searches at 32 locations across Jammu and Kashmir as part of an investigation into alleged support networks associated with Pakistan-backed terrorist organisations. The investigation examined suspected involvement in recruitment, financial assistance, logistical support and other activities. These were investigative allegations, but they showed how important authorities considered the wider support ecosystem.

The Overground Worker: An Invisible Link

Kashmir's experience brings attention to the role of Overground Workers, commonly known as OGWs. The term is used by security agencies to describe individuals suspected of assisting militant organisations without necessarily participating directly in armed violence. Their activities may include facilitating communication, providing shelter, arranging resources or connecting militants with local contacts.

The challenge for counterterrorism agencies is therefore twofold: identifying genuine support structures while protecting innocent individuals from guilt by association.

The April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack, which killed 26 civilians, demonstrated the continuing capacity of terrorist violence to destabilise Kashmir and trigger a wider regional crisis. India's subsequent military response, Operation Sindoor, highlighted the strategic consequences of such attacks. Yet military retaliation and the elimination of perpetrators address only part of the problem. The larger question concerns the organisational relationships that allow terrorist groups to regenerate their capabilities.

Why the Most Important Individual May Never Attack

Traditional counterterrorism assessments frequently concentrate on leadership hierarchies and operational commanders. However, Social Network Analysis offers another way of understanding terrorist organisations. Instead of examining individuals only through their titles or activities, it studies the relationships connecting them.

An individual with relatively few public appearances may connect several otherwise separate groups. Another may maintain relationships between recruiters, financiers and organisational leaders. Such individuals may occupy important positions even without direct involvement in violence.

Social Network Analysis uses concepts such as degree centrality, betweenness centrality and brokerage to understand these relationships. In simple terms, it asks who is connected to whom, who links separate parts of a network, and how organisational relationships are distributed.

This creates an important distinction between visibility and influence.

A militant who carries out an attack is highly visible. A facilitator who maintains important organisational connections may be considerably less visible. Yet visibility alone cannot determine which individual is more significant to the organisation.

Equally, network centrality does not prove criminal responsibility. An individual's importance must be established through evidence of their actual activities and organisational role.

From Kashmir to the Wider Terrorist Ecosystem

This problem is not confined to Kashmir. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have demonstrated how terrorist organisations can operate through networks extending beyond their immediate fighting units.

Their experiences also show why the death or arrest of prominent leaders does not necessarily produce organisational collapse. The survival of financial relationships, recruitment mechanisms and ideological networks can allow organisations to adapt.

In Kashmir, this raises the possibility that the future of militancy may depend not only on armed infiltration but also on the survival of less visible support structures.

A meaningful counterterrorism strategy must therefore look beyond the number of militants killed, arrested or surrendered. It must also assess whether the organisation retains the capacity to recruit, finance, communicate and rebuild.

Rethinking Counterterrorism: Lessons from Africa

India has made considerable efforts to tackle terrorist financing, recruitment and logistical support. But the success of counterterrorism cannot be judged only by the number of militants killed or arrested. The bigger question is whether the networks that support them have actually weakened. And this is where the role of ordinary people becomes important.

There is an interesting lesson from East Africa. Tanzania and Kenya have experimented with a community policing approach called Nyumba Kumi, meaning Ten Households. The idea is simple. People living in the same neighbourhood know their surroundings, understand local problems and can work together to make their communities safer. This spirit of collective responsibility also finds an echo in the African philosophy of Ubuntu, which reminds us that the wellbeing of an individual is closely connected to that of the community. Although the model has its limitations, it offers something worth considering. Security cannot be left entirely to the Army, police or government officials.

Kashmir could draw an important lesson from this experience. The people of Kashmir must be seen not merely as sources of information but as equal partners in maintaining peace. Families, teachers, local leaders and young people have an important role in preventing militant recruitment and ensuring that violence does not find acceptance within society. This requires trust, dialogue and genuine cooperation, not suspicion or pressure.

The fight against terrorism, therefore, must weaken the networks that keep militancy alive. The State has its responsibilities, but lasting peace cannot be secured by military strength alone. It also needs the confidence, cooperation and participation of ordinary people, who have the greatest stake in living without fear.

Dr. Sreoshi Sinha is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the School of International Relations and Peace Studies, Nalanda University, Rajgir, Bihar.